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Abstract
In order to investigate and compare welfare states or specific welfare programmes, scientists, opinion‐makers and politi‐
cians rely on indicators. As many of the concepts or objects studied are somewhat abstract, these indicators can often
only be approximations. In comparative welfare‐state research, scholars have suggested several approximating indicators
to quantitatively measure and compare the generosity of public welfare provision, with a special focus on cash benefits.
These indicators include social spending, social rights and benefit receipt. We present these indicators systematically, and
critically discuss how suitable they are for comparing the generosity of parenting leave policies in developedwelfare states.
Subsequently, we illustrate how the operationalisation of leave generosity by means of different indicators can lead to dif‐
ferent rankings, interpretations and qualifications of countries. Hence, indicator choices have to be considered carefully
and suitably justified, depending on the actual research interest.
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1. Introduction
Leave policies for parents have not only emerged as an
important subject in scientific research, but also increas‐
ingly feature in public debates. With the ambition to
achievemore‐equal access to employment‐related social
rights and to reconcile paid work and family responsibili‐
ties, parental leave in particular has been the subject of
various policy reforms, both within and outside Europe.
Together with maternity and paternity leave, these poli‐
cies vary substantially across countries (Koslowski, Blum,
Dobrotić, Kaufman, & Moss, 2020) but also share some
common trends (Moss & Deven, 2019).
To be able to compare public welfare policies across
space and time, and to inform policy‐making, scholars
have sought to develop adequate indicators. ‘Generosity’
can be considered a key concept behind most of these
indicators. In comparative public policy research, the
concept is frequently used when comparing the bud‐
getary volume of social programmes (e.g., Castles, 2002,
2009) or policy aspects such as the size of the popula‐
tion covered for a particular social risk by a specific pub‐
lic programme, the eligibility conditions of programmes,
the duration of benefit payments and the amount of cash
benefits (e.g., Kangas & Palme, 2007; Nelson et al., 2020;
Scruggs, 2007). The first comparative social policy indica‐
tors focused on policies that protect against ‘old social
risks’ (e.g., unemployment or illness). With emerging
‘new social risks’ (Bonoli, 2005) and policies such as par‐
enting leave, a need for comparative quantitative indi‐
cators that can summarise the characteristics of these
policies developed. In constructing these new indicators,
researchers tended to build on the generosity concept
as applied in the comparative study of policies such as
unemployment protection programmes. When doing so,
some researchers refer to benefit generosity exclusively
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in terms of benefit amounts (e.g., Dobrotić & Blum, 2019;
Ranci, Österle, Arlotti, & Parma, 2019) and others refer to
it also in terms of the coverage rate and eligibility criteria
of a benefit, and/or the duration for which it is granted
(e.g., Nelson et al., 2020; Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010).
However, this does not take into account themultidimen‐
sionality of parenting leave policies. The role of the ‘new
social risk’ policies—and parental leave in particular—is
not only to protect against income loss by generous ben‐
efits, but also to prevent the adverse effect of becoming
a parent on women’s position on the labour market and
consequently on gender equality.
The multidimensionality of leave policies challenges
the suitability of the generosity concept. Further there
is not yet a strong consensus among researchers about
the actual meaning of ‘generosity’ in the context of par‐
enting leave policies. For example, generous cash bene‐
fits may be beneficial in the short term, but if they are
paid over an extended period of time, they may actu‐
ally hinder women’s career progress and, in the long
term, exacerbate gender income inequality and the risk
of poverty (Bruning & Plantenga, 1999; Pronzato, 2009).
Some scholars have tried to address this ambiguity in
the generosity concept and have produced a compara‐
tive indicator that combines the duration of benefit pay‐
ment with the level of benefit. This ‘full‐time equivalent’
of leave indicates how long a leavewould be paid if it was
to compensate for 100 percent of foregone earnings (Ray
et al., 2010; Thévenon, 2011). However, gender equality
has been recognised as a dimension of leave policies that
is distinct from generosity. For example, Ray et al. (2010)
created a gender equality index based on the proportion
of leave reserved for fathers and the benefit level. More
recently, Dobrotić and Blum (2020) have challenged the
‘generosity’ concept by focusing on the access to leave
benefits. This aspect has been largely overlooked in
leave research literaturewhichmostly compares the gen‐
erosity of leave policies on the basis of leave duration,
replacement rates (i.e., the proportion of labour income
that is compensated for by a benefit) or a combina‐
tion of these two aspects (Ray et al., 2010; Thévenon,
2011). In their novel approach to approximating leave
accessibility, Dobrotić and Blum (2020) assess policies
based on entitlement principles (citizenship‐based ver‐
sus employment‐based benefits) and eligibility criteria,
which they frame under the concept ‘inclusiveness’ of
leave rights. Accordingly, their approach conceives acces‐
sibility to leave benefits as a separate and distinct dimen‐
sion from the generosity concept, with the latter being
instead referred to as benefit levels and the benefit pay‐
ment duration.
In this article, we will map the development of indi‐
cators that seek to compare parenting leave policies in
mature welfare states. We will also analyse their poten‐
tial and pitfalls regarding the methodological approach
as well as to their use in studies examining the socially
stratifying and gendering effects of leave policies. Rather
than adding to the multitude of existing indicators, the
original contribution of this article to existing literature
is a critical overview of the different types of indicators,
as well as outlining new avenues for future research on
leave policies. We will follow the mainstream literature
and use the term ‘generosity’ in its broad sense, includ‐
ing benefit accessibility, benefit duration and the level of
benefit payments.
2. Studying Parenting Leave Policies:
Operationalisations and Measurements
Parenting leave policies fall under umbrella terms that
include policies enabling parents to provide care for their
children. Most commonly, this includes maternity leave,
paternity leave, parental leave, childcare leave and leave
for sick children. In the current article, the focus is on the
three most commonly discussed forms: maternity, pater‐
nity and parental leave. Maternity leave is typically avail‐
able to working mothers as a health and welfare mea‐
sure that is “taken just before, during and immediately
after childbirth” (Koslowski et al., 2020, p. 6). Paternity
leave is targeted at fathers, and usually “taken soon after
the birth of a child, and intended to enable the father
to spend time with his partner, new child and [where
this applies] older children” (Koslowski et al., 2020, p. 6).
Parental leave is available to both mothers and fathers.
It can take different forms, including a non‐transferable
individual right, an individual right that can be trans‐
ferred to the other parent, or a family right that par‐
ents can divide between themselves as they wish (OECD,
n.d.‐b). Parental leave is meant to provide time for child‐
care and working parents can make use of it after mater‐
nity or paternity leave, either on a full‐time or a part‐time
basis and until the child reaches a specific age. In some
countries, however, parental leave benefit is available to
economically inactive or unemployed parents from the
date of childbirth (Dobrotić & Blum, 2020).
The first parenting leave indicators were created of
the blueprint designed for policies covering ‘old social
risks.’ Therefore, we follow the main trends in the devel‐
opment of comparative social policy indicators and the
way in which they have been used to compare parent‐
ing leave policies. In line with the literature, we distin‐
guish between social expenditure, social rights and ben‐
efit recipiency indicators, and classify them in two levels:
macro and micro (see Figure 1). Whilst macro‐level indi‐
cators are intended to compare policies across countries,
micro‐level indicators allow comparison between individ‐
uals and households. Where micro‐level data is aggre‐
gated to the national level, it can nevertheless also serve
to describe differences between countries. The following
sections will elaborate on the different types of indica‐
tors at these two levels.
2.1. Macro‐Level Indicators
Two main types of indicators have been used to com‐
pare the generosity of public welfare benefits: social






• benefit dura on
• benefit amount
benefit receipt











• benefit dura on
• material scope





Figure 1. Indicators of leave generosity.
expenditure and social rights. These two types have
also been adopted by researchers studying parenting
leaves. In terms of conceptualisation, both indicators
generally seek to approximate the extent of statutory
leave benefits. However, there are considerable differ‐
ences between them beyond this general analytical
focus. Social expenditure is commonly represented by a
single value, indicating either the actual public expendi‐
ture on a particular policy programme or a value rela‐
tive to GDP. Although social rights can be represented
by a single indicator (e.g., replacement rate), they are
often compiled into a composite indicator, resulting in an
index that captures the complex interplay between sev‐
eral aspects of a policy programme. Social expenditure
and social rights indicators also differ in the scope of their
research objectives. In contrast to social expenditure,
many existing social rights‐based indexes for leave poli‐
cies also aim to capture the extent to which these rights
are geared towards reducing gender inequality (Ciccia
& Verloo, 2012; Dobrotić & Blum, 2020; Javornik, 2014;
Javornik & Kurowska, 2017; Ray et al., 2010).
2.1.1. Social Expenditure
Social expenditure data approximates the budgetary
‘welfare effort’ or ‘welfare commitment’ that govern‐
ments make to finance public social benefits. With this
indicator, variation in policy generosity is an expression
of differences in ‘how much’ is spent on a particular pro‐
gramme or on social welfare in general (Castles, 2002,
2009). The indicator has been widely used in research
into public social benefit schemes. It has been used
either as a dependent variable (Clasen & Siegel, 2007;
Kittel &Obinger, 2003) or an independent variable, in the
latter case to study, for example, public attitudes, polit‐
ical participation or wellbeing (for a short overview see
Kunißen, 2019). However, it has been less used in the con‐
text of leave policies (Luci‐Greulich & Thévenon, 2013).
The size of social expenditure encompasses all dimen‐
sions of the generosity concept. The amount of social
expenditure is affected by the extent of the popula‐
tion that receives the benefits, which is in turn deter‐
mined by the eligibility conditions. For example, in two
countries with identical leave benefit amounts per recip‐
ient, social expenditure will be higher in the country
with citizenship‐based entitlements to leave than in the
one with employment‐based entitlements. Social expen‐
diture is also influenced by the duration of the benefit
payment. As a similar example, social expenditurewill be
higher in the countrywith a longer benefit payment dura‐
tion. Lastly, social expenditure is also influenced by the
amount of the benefit per recipient. There are also other
factors such as take‐up that affect the total amount of
social expenditure. However, these are not determined
by the design of the policy, but by its attractiveness to
potential recipients.
Consequently, social expenditure data provides a sim‐
ple summary of the overall policy design and policy
implementation within a specific context. Nonetheless,
there are some shortcomings that researchers should be
aware of when using this indicator in comparative stud‐
ies. Since social expenditure is affected by the size of the
population that receives the benefit, it should be cor‐
rected for the size of the eligible population (De Deken
& Kittel, 2007; Kangas & Palme, 2007; Scruggs, 2007); for
example, by dividing spending by the proportion of par‐
ents with dependent children of a given age. However,
this approach is problematic, as it might be difficult to
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find an appropriate variable to approximate the eligible
population and to do so across different contexts (van
Oorschot, 2013, p. 228).
Another shortcoming lies in the use of GDP as a fac‐
tor used to adjust for national differences in wealth, as
the comparability of the values may be compromised
if GDP fluctuates. To compensate for this, spending
can also be measured as absolute amounts expressed
in purchasing power parities (PPP). In Figure 2, we
display unadjusted social expenditure data expressed
as a percentage of GDP. Using this indicator, coun‐
tries such as Estonia, Hungary, Sweden, Finland and
the Czech Republic are shown as having the most gen‐
erous parental leave policies. By contrast, the United
Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland
and Spain stand out as having the least generous poli‐
cies. In Figure 3, we show the amount of spending on
leave policies, adjusted for the number of live births and
expressed in PPP. Estonia, Sweden, Finland and the Czech
Republic are joined by Denmark at the top of the rank‐
ing, Hungary appears less generous, and Luxembourg
shows the most generous system. At the bottom end
of the ranking, the same countries appear to be the
least generous: United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain. Although adjusting
for the eligible population does produce amore nuanced
picture, the correlation between the twomeasurements
is very strong (r = 0.80). Probably themost pressing issue
with the social expenditure data is the fact that it does
not provide information on who is supposed to receive
or actually does receive a benefit. This can have implica‐
tions for gender equality—something that is of particular
interest in parental leave research.
2.1.2. Social Rights
Expenditure data has considerable limitations for the








Figure 2. Total public expenditure on maternity and parental leave, as a percentage of GDP, 2015. Source: Authors’ calcu‐









Figure 3. Public expenditure on maternity and parental leaves per live birth, in USD 2010 PPP, 2015. Data for Greece and
Poland refer to 2012. Source: OECD (n.d.‐b).
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outcomes (e.g., stratification and gender equality). Social
rights indicators were developed as an alternative mea‐
surement of the extent of ‘welfare commitment.’ Social
rights data can be both quantitative and qualitative,
but in this review, we only focus on the quantitative
indicators. These social rights indicators are a result of
quantification processes that combine legislative infor‐
mation on specific policy programmes with hypothetical
or so‐calledmodel households. Thesemodel households
assume specific values for wages (average or median)
for a standard work contract in a particular sector.
They also specify a particular intensity of employment
for the household members and the household size.
The model household is set for each database, although
some databases calculate social rights indicators for sev‐
eral types of model households (e.g., the OECD Family
Database). Since the model household is constant across
countries, this approach provides a high degree of cross‐
country comparability between policy designs and their
outcomes in terms of replacement rates.
The social rights data comprises several indicators. In
the context of parenting leave, the most common indi‐
cators are the leave duration and the replacement rate.
For example, the Parental Leave Benefit dataset (Nelson
et al., 2020) provides data on maternity, paternity and
parental leave duration, gross and net benefit levels,
and replacement rates. The data covers 34 countries for
the period between 1950 and 2015, with five‐year data
collection intervals. Another example with comparable
information that is still being updated is the OECD Family
Database (OECD, n.d.‐c). Other databases are no longer
kept up to date but still contain valuable data, such
as the Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policy
Indicators (Multilinks, 2011), the Family Policy Database
(Gornick, Meyers, & Ross, 1997), and the Comparative
Maternity, Parental and Childcare Leave and Benefits
Database (Gauthier, 2011). However, none of these
databases have attempted to quantify the accessibility
of parenting leave benefits as an important dimension
of the generosity concept. This gap in the literature has
been recently pointed out by Dobrotić and Blum (2019,
2020). They addressed the issue by introducing an eligi‐
bility index that quantifies the accessibility of parental
leave benefits on the basis of entitlement principles
(citizenship‐based or employment‐based) and eligibility
conditions (e.g., qualifying period).
Figures 4 and 5 provide examples of social rights
data drawn from the OECD Family Database. They show,
respectively, the number of weeks of total paid leave
available to mothers and the average payment rate (as a
percentage of gross earnings of a model family with
two adult earners and two children) for OECD countries
in 2018. These two indicators refer to benefit duration
and benefit levels as two aspects of leave generosity.
Examining leave duration in Figure 4, Estonia, Slovakia,
Finland and Hungary are shown as having the most
generous leave policies. By contrast, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Spain, Iceland and Ireland appear as the
least generous. Again, most countries consistently rank
high or low in terms of leave generosity, and the cor‐
relation of this indicator with spending on leave poli‐
cies (Figure 2) is strong (r = 0.75). At the same time,
the differences between this example of a social rights
indicator and the social expenditure approach become
clear. For instance, countries such as Sweden and espe‐
cially Iceland score higher in terms of social expenditure,
while Austria appears more generous in terms of the
paid leave duration available to mothers. Figure 5 shows
yet another ranking. In terms of average payment rates,
Finland and France appear the least generous, while
Lithuania, the Netherlands and Spain are shown as being
the most generous. This is the result of the availabil‐
ity of 16 weeks of maternity benefits paid at 100 per‐
cent of the previous labour income in both Spain and
the Netherlands, while parental leave is unpaid. In many
other countries, average payment rates (calculated on
the basis of paid maternity and parental leave rights)
are lower, but in reality, women are entitled to bene‐
fits for a longer period of time. The correlation of aver‐











Figure 4. Number of weeks of total paid leave available to mothers. Source: OECD (n.d.‐b) for 2018.












Figure 5. Average payment rates available to mothers as a percentage of previous wages. Source: OECD (n.d.‐b) for 2018.
(r = −0.09). This means that spending on leave poli‐
cies appears to be associated more with the number of
weeks of paid leave than with the level of the payment.
Therefore, the high spending levels in Sweden or Iceland
could be explained by high rates of take up, to which we
turn further below.
The advantage of social rights indicators is that they
provide a much more nuanced picture of public welfare
provision with regard to policy design, and hence policy
intension. Their use also offers more insight into who
is supposed to receive the benefit. Additionally, where
the indicators are linked to socio‐economic and gender
equality aspects (e.g., Ciccia & Verloo, 2012; Javornik,
2014; Javornik & Kurowska, 2017; Ray et al., 2010), social
rights data also sheds light on the socially stratifying and
gendered outcomes these policies can produce.
The limitation of social rights data mainly lies in the
use of model households. The extent to which these are
representative of real populations has been questioned,
as has to what extent the prevalence of these model
households varies across countries (Gallie & Paugam,
2000). Furthermore, where average net replacement
rates are used to study trends in policies, wage develop‐
ments and tax policies are ignored and the generosity of
replacement rates can easily be misinterpreted. There is
also a discrepancy between nominal entitlement, bene‐
fit administration and actual take‐up rates. Social rights
data is unable to reflect this; however, it can be expected
to affect the actual realisation of social rights. Further,
the social rights approach usually does not have the
capacity to take income and benefit ceilings into account.
This can lead to overestimating the generosity of the
leave benefits. On top of this, the aspect of time is usually
disregarded in such an approach. For example, a replace‐
ment rate that is initially relatively high but decreases
shortly after or is only paid for a few weeks in a year
may in the end be less generous than a benefit with a
continuously paid lower replacement rate that is paid for
an entire year or longer. Lastly, when qualitative informa‐
tion on benefit rights is quantified and included in com‐
posite indicators (e.g., Dobrotić & Blum, 2020), coding
and weighting the different components can be crucial.
Hence, decisions about how to attribute scores to differ‐
ent qualitative information and how to weight one com‐
ponent relative to another not only have to be suitably
justified, but also require sensitivity analyses and care‐
ful interpretation.
Two recent sources of social rights data attempt to
deal with a number of these shortcomings. The OECD
Family Support Calculator, for example, allows us to com‐
pare leave policy entitlements based on the characteris‐
tics of a wide range of individuals and households, tak‐
ing the heterogeneity of the population into account
(OECD, n.d.‐d). A similar model‐family approach termed
the Hypothetical Household Tool (HHoT) is now also
available in EUROMOD (Hufkens et al., 2019). This is a
microsimulation tool that is based on the EU Survey on
Income and Living Conditions (EU‐SILC) and allows the
calculation and observation of the statutory leave entitle‐
ments for a wide array of hypothetical households that
can be specified by the user. The HHoT also allows us
to take into account the interaction with wage develop‐
ments and tax policies. Such an approach is ideally suited
for between‐country comparisons and allows the compu‐
tation of policy indicators for a wide range of households.
Nevertheless, it does not solve the issue of representa‐
tiveness of the population.
2.2. Micro‐Level Indicators
To date, micro‐level data has been a relatively underused
source of information in assessing the generosity of leave
benefits. Dominant examples of micro‐level indicators
are based on social rights and on benefit receipt data.
Given the nature of the data, these indicators are not
only suitable to study the generosity of parenting leave
benefits but also their stratifying and gendering effects.
They could be used to statistically model, for example,
the association between benefit amounts and gender or
education. This is a huge advantage over the approaches
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we have discussed so far. Furthermore, the combination
of microsimulation with benefit receipt data can esti‐
mate the degree of non‐take‐up with considerable pre‐
cision. The use of micro‐level data can therefore not only
reveal the socio‐economic profile of parents who miss
out on support fromchild‐related leave programmes, but
also of parents who are targeted by these policies yet
are not using them. Consequently, such data can pro‐
vide valuable insights into the effectiveness of policy
designs and is an important source of information for pol‐
icy reforms and policy learning.
2.2.1. Social Rights
Social rights are commonly accepted as macro‐level indi‐
cators that capture the characteristics of policy designs
in terms of legal provisions. Less attention is paid to
their ability to link macro‐level policy designs with micro‐
level social reality. This has only been possible in recent
years with the increasing availability of comparative
legislative data on policy design, such as the Mutual
Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) or
the International Reviews on Leave Policies and Related
Research produced by the International Network on
Leave Policies & Research (LP&R), and rich comparative
social survey data such as the EU‐SILC. To overcome some
of the shortcomings of the previously mentioned macro‐
level indicators, scholars have used imputation methods
to assess who should—based on national leave policy
regulations—receive a benefit, for how long and what
amount. This data can either be aggregated to formulate
a single‐value parenting leave indicator or can be used at
the individual level to analyse the variation in eligibility
and entitlements, both within and across countries.
One of the earliest examples of the application
of this method to parenting leave data is a study by
Zabel (2008), who simulated maternity leave for women
using the British Household Panel Survey. Comparable
with this, EUROMOD introduced parenting leave poli‐
cies in their tax‐benefit simulation models mapping
the position of eligible individuals in the EU‐SILC
sample (Immervoll, O’Donoghue, & Sutherland, 1999).
More‐recent attempts include the simulation of leave
entitlements such as parental leave benefits for a few
European countries (Avram & Popova, 2020; Popova &
Navicke, 2020). EUROMOD is also modelling parenting
leave entitlements for parents in the EU‐SILC sample.
This allows us to measure and compare the stability of
leave benefits across the duration of the benefits (e.g., if
the leave design provides more‐generous payments for
the first months of leave). This is unique and a distinct
feature of the EUROMOD approach, nevertheless, some
limitations are apparent. First, only leave entitlements
that are part of the tax‐benefit system can be included.
In cases where leave is unpaid or payment is arranged
through private insurance, it cannot be programmed
into the model. Second, this particular microsimulation
approach is subject to a selection effect. It does not
account for the possibility that some people may opt
out of or postpone parenthood due to unfavourable eco‐
nomic conditions that are not alleviated by the support
provided by the parenting leave programme. It also does
not provide the distribution of social rights that are fully
comparable across countries butwhere the profile of par‐
ents considerably differs.
Bártová and Emery (2018) used an approach simi‐
lar to the one of EUROMOD by applying microsimula‐
tion methods for a population of women of childbearing
age and therefore ‘at risk’ of giving birth. This approach
allows us to observe the distribution of social rights
to parenting leave across the whole population that
is realistically subject to the possibility of experiencing
the relevant social risk. By design, this microsimulation
approach provides direct insight into the generosity of
parenting leave policies as illustrated in Figure 6. This
shows the proportion of women between the age of
20 and 40 who would be eligible either to maternity
leave, parental leave or both, if they were to have a
child in that particular year. Although the expenditure
data presented in Figures 2 and 3 is influenced by the
actual number of parents receiving the benefit in a given
year, Figure 6 is based on a hypothetical situation of all
womenbetween the age of 20 and 40 giving birth in 2008.
Therefore, the two types of data cannot be directly com‐
pared. Nonetheless, it points to some substantial differ‐
ences in the country outcomes with respect to generos‐
ity. For instance, Austria appears as highly generous on
the eligibility indicator, with maternity and/or parental
benefits being available to all women who give birth.
By contrast, when using expenditure data to evaluate
leave generosity, Austria turns out to be among the least
generous countries. The outcome is different even when
using the indicator of the number of weeks of total paid
parental leave, where it falls somewhere in the middle.
Microsimulation has also been applied to the amount
of cash benefits, and thanks to its link with survey data,
it can easily be broken down by socio‐economic sta‐
tus and other characteristics (Bártová, 2017; Bártová
& Emery, 2018). Another advantage of this approach
is that it allows us to study the policy outcomes for
populations that are at lower risk of becoming parents.
Using these hypothetical parents among the population
of teenagers, single women or single men enables us to
understand the situation of teenage mothers or single
fatherswhomay be overlookedwhen using conventional
methods. Nonetheless, the microsimulation approaches
also have their limitations. A key assumption underlying
microsimulation benefit models is that of full take‐up:
It is assumed that anyone who is entitled to a benefit
actually claims it. The approach therefore only approxi‐
mates social rights to potential benefit recipients. In the
field of family policies in general, and parental leave poli‐
cies in particular, such an assumption is unrealistic. It is
well documented that leave entitlements are underused,
with strong gender and socio‐economic cleavages in its
uptake (Ghysels & Van Lancker, 2011; Ray et al., 2010).












Figure 6. Percentage of women (20–40 years) who would be eligible for a parental leave benefit were they to give birth in
2008. Source: Bártová (2017).
2.2.2. Benefit Receipt
A last set of indicators draw on benefit receipt to com‐
pare the extent of public welfare provision across dif‐
ferent target populations (individuals and households
within a country, and different country populations) and
over time (De Deken & Clasen, 2011, 2013; Otto, 2018;
van Oorschot, 2013). Data on benefit receipt is usu‐
ally sourced from administrative or survey data that is
reported at an individual and/or household level. In con‐
trast to social rights data, benefit access is not a hypo‐
thetical entitlement. Depending on the unit of analysis,
more accessible benefits translate into a higher propor‐
tion of individuals or households receiving the benefit or
taking up leave, relative to a specific target population.
For example, in the case of parental leave, micro‐level
information on leave benefit receipt is put in relation to
the number of people with young dependent children.
These take‐up rates can also be compared across coun‐
tries. Likewise, benefit amounts are not hypothetical or
case‐typical replacement rates, but are expressed either
through directly reported amounts, or as the propor‐
tion of a reported benefit relative to a reference income.
The latter is more suitable for comparing regions or coun‐
tries. Where the data is available, benefit receipt could
also be operationalised as the duration for which a ben‐
efit is received.
Although some studies have already used administra‐
tive records to gauge the take‐up of different types of
leaves in particular countries (Kil, Wood, & Neels, 2018;
Koslowski & Kadar‐Satat, 2019; Marynissen, Mussino,
Wood, & Duvander, 2019), comparative studies are
scarce (for an exception see Karu & Tremblay, 2018).
The problem is that administrative records are not avail‐
able in most countries, and where they are, the concepts
of leave use are not always comparable. Administrative
records are based on administrative definitions of poli‐
cies and statutory entitlements, tied to the laws and
(social security) programmes of the country under study.
Accordingly, the need population can be different, the
way of classifying and recording take‐up can be differ‐
ent, and these categories can vary over time when poli‐
cies change (De Deken & Clasen, 2013; Otto, 2018).
In that sense, harmonised cross‐country survey data
offers better prospects to examine leave uptake across
countries and over time. Comparing the take‐up of leave
of a particular household with the respective social
rights entitlements would even allow us to estimate the
amount of non‐take up in leave use. However, cross‐
country harmonised surveys in which the use of leave
is properly recorded are rare, as respondents are often
asked to describe their labour market status during the
past week or at the time of the survey, rather than
in terms of labour market status in the period after
birth. Furthermore, for many countries it is not possi‐
ble to isolate maternity leave benefits from child bene‐
fits, or parental leave benefits from unemployment or
sickness benefits (Zardo‐Trindade & Goedemé, 2020).
The EU Labour Force Survey (EU‐LFS) has so far included
three ad hoc modules on the reconciliation of work
and family life in 2005, 2010 and 2018. In this mod‐
ule, detailed questions are asked about childcare use,
the use of leave and the use of career break schemes
with regard to the youngest child living in the household.
Unfortunately, the questions and the selection of the
relevant population changed over time, which severely
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hampers comparability. Moreover, it is not always clear
how respondents interpreted the questions, in partic‐
ular in systems in which there is no clear distinction
between maternity and parental leave (e.g., the Nordic
countries). As a result, only a few studies have used
this data to examine social inequalities in leave take‐up
(Ghysels & Van Lancker, 2011; Van Lancker, 2017) or to
model the probability to work by individual take‐up of
leave (Van Lancker, 2018).
Using the EU‐LFS ad hoc module of 2018, Figure 7
shows the proportion of women between 18 and
64 years old taking care of children living in the house‐
hold. It shows how different benefit design aspects can
translate into actual use of these policies. According to
this data, countries such as Austria, Sweden, Slovakia,
Czech Republic, Estonia and Finland appear the most
generous, while countries such as Switzerland, Portugal,
Spain and the Netherlands appear the least generous.
Again, the country ranking does not change substantially
formost countries, and the correlationwith public expen‐
diture is strong (r = 0.68). In generous countries such as
Sweden, Estonia, Slovakia and Czech Republic, spending
on leave benefits is high (Figures 2 and 3), all women of
child‐bearing age are eligible (Figure 6) and social rights
are usually generous as well (in terms of the number of
paid weeks available and/or payment rates; see Figures 4
and 5). This translates into high levels of take‐up. Vice
versa, in countries such as Spain or the Netherlands,
spending is low, fewer women of childbearing age are
eligible for leave, parental leave is unpaid and take‐up
rates are low. Some countries, however, change ranks.
In Austria, for example, spending on leave is relatively
low whereas both eligibility and take‐up rates are high.
One reason could be the fact that in Austria, the class and
gender inequalities in use are substantial, with only few
fathers taking up leave, while in countries with compara‐
ble features such as Sweden such inequalities are more
modest (see Koslowski et al., 2020). Although beyond the
scope of the present article, further analysis using micro‐
level social rights and benefit recipient indicators would
allow such questions to be answered.
3. Conclusion
In this article, we have reviewed various approaches to
the comparative study of the generosity of leave bene‐
fits based on social expenditure, social rights and benefit
recipiency data. These indicators enabled us to analyse
and compare the degree to which parenting leave poli‐
cies are generous in terms of their budgetary volume,
their accessibility, the duration of leave, the (relative)
amounts of leave benefits and leave benefit receipt.
We systematically separated the various indicators
into two categories, depending on whether they were
constructed on the macro or micro level, and we high‐
lighted the many difficulties and pitfalls involved in mea‐
suring and operationalising the generosity of leave poli‐
cies. Although some countries consistently rank high or
low in terms of generosity, the devil is in the details.
We showed how the operationalisation of leave poli‐
cies at macro and micro levels according to different
approaches can lead to different rankings, interpreta‐
tions and qualifications of countries and leave systems.
We found that most of the parenting leave indicators
that are commonly used measure only the benefit dura‐
tion and the amount of cash benefits. This is in line
with previous criticism of the existing policy indicators
(Dobrotić & Blum, 2019, 2020). It could be argued that
social expenditure data provides information about gen‐
erosity, because it constitutes the outcome of access
to benefits, their duration and amount. However, it is
very difficult to disentangle each component of the gen‐
erosity concept and assign a specific value or a propor‐








Figure 7. Proportion of respondents (18–64 years) having used parental leave for their youngest child. Source: Authors’
own calculations based on the EU‐LFS 2018 ad hoc module.
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expenditure data also does not provide information on
who actually receives the benefits, and consequently is
not suitable for use in studies on the stratifying or gen‐
dering effects of leave policies. Social rights indicators
constructed on the macro level provide a standardised
and more detailed way to compare policy designs across
countries and time. This is because they are built on
the social rights of model households. Nonetheless, the
use of model families is also the main reason why this
approach has been criticised. It has raised questions
about how representative they are in contemporary soci‐
eties, and to what extent standardised model families
equally prevail across countries. This criticism does not
stem from the inability of social rights indicators to effec‐
tively measure varying social policy designs, but instead
from its broad‐brush approach that is not suitable for all
research questions (Siegel, 2007).
We found that indicators based on data for bene‐
fit recipiency and social rights that are measured on
the micro‐level can provide a much better opportunity
for analysing the generosity of parenting leave bene‐
fits. In contrast to the macro‐level indicators, micro‐level
indicators have the ability to provide policy indica‐
tors for each dimension of the generosity concept.
The micro‐level social rights indicators create a link
between the national legislation on parenting leave and
the individual characteristics of survey respondents by
means of microsimulation. This offers an insight into
the distribution of social rights in real populations and
their effect on social stratification and gender inequal‐
ity. However, the approach is limited because it does
not offer any information about the actual use of leave
policies. This limitation is addressed by benefit recipi‐
ency data, which captures the actual take‐up of benefits.
Nevertheless, in this regard also, issues of comparabil‐
ity are important, as the operationalisation of benefit
receipt or leave use is often linked to country‐specific leg‐
islation. While headway can and must be made in terms
of the availability and quality of data based upon har‐
monised cross‐country databases, there is no one‐size‐
fits‐all indicator that adequately captures all the dimen‐
sions that are relevant to leave research.
Against this background, we would like to stress that
the choice of the indicator very much depends on the
exact research question one seeks to address, and how
this choice can be theoretically underpinned. Where a
more comprehensive understanding of leave policies in
different national contexts and across time is needed,
ideally different indicators should be combined.
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